

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM-1172

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

Chief of Station, Germany
Chief of Base, Munich
Chief of Base, Frankfurt

ATTN:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

74-126-44/1

DATE

18 NOV 1959

Chief, SR

MEMORANDUM FOR

Journal of Project AEGUOR for Fiscal 1960

FIELD OFFICE

Field Comments

DISPATCH

RE "CSS" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED
BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. Primarily on the basis of [] a memorandum in defense of the Project, written at Headquarters several months ago, it has been decided to request renewal of AEGUOR as it stands for Fiscal 1960. (Copies of [] memorandum are attached.) The renewal dates of KUCAGE projects are staggered, and AEGUOR comes up on 17 November. We are requesting a total of [] for the newspaper and \$7,000 for KUCAGE operations.

2. It has been noted that AEGUOR in the past has been handled in a fraction-
alized manner at Headquarters and has, to some extent, suffered from a lack of
continuous, across-the-board interest as a result. We have, therefore, central-
ized responsibility for all aspects of the Project in SR/3-P2 and expect that its
management from one desk and as one homogeneous Project will improve its efforts.

3. Judging from the correspondence, the Project's sole continuing activi-
ties at the present time are publication and distribution of the newspaper and
the Radio Madrid broadcasts, other programs having been terminated at various
times. As you will note from the budget breakdown above, Headquarters is inter-
ested in reviewing ARCAMBISTA 1 potential in the KUCAGE field and is hopeful of
reviving it, provided the Field believes there is sufficient potential. We have
in mind HEDKIN operations of the following types: (1) contact of Soviets coming
out (see HEDW-8992); (2) operations based on ARCAMBISTA 1 members and other
Byelorussian and third national contacts going in.

4. Here at Headquarters we have a rather imprecise picture of what the
operational potentialities of ARCAMBISTA 1 are at this juncture. Again judging
from the correspondence, there has been considerable shifting of the group's per-
sonnel since the early HEDKIN days. We should therefore appreciate a survey
both of ARCAMBISTA 1's present active operational apparatus and how it fits
together and of potential personnel and operational opportunity, both in the
KUCAGE and KUCAGE fields. A clearer picture of what the Project provides in the
way of tools will improve Headquarters' capability for providing support and
realistic comment. Although [] might well be able to fill most of the
above requirement on the basis of his long and recent association with the Proj-
ect, it might be worth considering an operational reappraisal of the organization
with ARCAMBISTA 1 himself in order to bring our knowledge of his organization up
to date.

5. We do feel ready at this time to comment tentatively on ARCAMBISTA 1's
request for \$4,000 for the Radio Madrid broadcasts. As a matter of economy we
would prefer not to consider the request favorably for this year at least.
According to our information, the Radio is undergoing a serious reorganization
on the administrative level, the outcome of which is not at all certain. More-
over, we would prefer to see what ARCAMBISTA 1 can accomplish in contact and
other HEDKIN operations prior to considering significant expansion of the
group's KUCAGE-sponsored KUCAGE program. Nevertheless, our attitude on this sub-
ject is flexible, and if the Field is able to present new information in favor
of the program, we would be glad to reconsider our position.

6. As you know, KUCAGE is now in the process of paying off some \$32,000 in
death benefits from the ARCAMBISTA 1 operations. As you also know, about a year
ago KUCAGE gave ARCAMBISTA 1 its approval to his plan to set up a Byelorussian
national memorial center in New York City. He would pay for this center with
the \$32,000 plus similar monies previously collected from KUCAGE and with funds
gathered from other sources. Although we are certainly obligated to pay the

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MAY 1962
GPO

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
REPLACES FORMS
51-20, 51-22A AND 51-23
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

74-126-44/1

CS COPY

\$32,000 eventually, we are holding up the payment temporarily pending the conclusion of our current operational review of the Project with you. There might well be a more productive way for AECAMBISTA 1. to invest these funds, both for the accomplishment of its own objectives and KUBARK's, too.

7. We have addressed this dispatch to German Station Headquarters because we wish to insure that all pertinent Station assets are used to get as comprehensive a picture as possible of AEQUOR's merits. We suggest that in addition to [] provide from his large fund of background knowledge, personalia and his assessment regarding AECAMBISTA 1 assets in various parts of the world and that the Station, in consultation with MOB and FOB, give Headquarters the benefit of its recommendations as to how AEQUOR may be more efficiently administered in the future.

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Attachment:

[] Memorandum HEREWITH

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - COS, Germany, w/2 cc. att. a/s
2 - MOB, w/2 cc. att. a/s
2 - FOB, w/2 cc. att. a/s
✓ 1 - RI, w/att. a/s
2 - SR/3, w/att. a/s

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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 750 million to 850 million. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 900 million by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 950 million by the year 2020. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1 billion by the year 2025. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.1 billion by the year 2030. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.2 billion by the year 2035. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.3 billion by the year 2040. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.4 billion by the year 2045. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.5 billion by the year 2050. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.6 billion by the year 2055. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.7 billion by the year 2060. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.8 billion by the year 2065. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.9 billion by the year 2070. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2 billion by the year 2075. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.1 billion by the year 2080. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.2 billion by the year 2085. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.3 billion by the year 2090. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.4 billion by the year 2095. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 2.5 billion by the year 2100.

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1. *Phragmites australis* (Cav.) Trin. ex Steud.

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

5. In December 1937 AMARISM I was able to get our back in contact with Rylorussian language broadcasts over Radio Madrid. These broadcasts are directed to the USSR and to the Rylorussian colonies in Spain. The broadcast schedule of these broadcasts in Madrid is known to us good. Various letters we have received from Palma showing that these Rylorussian broadcasts are listened to enthusiastically. AMARISM I has been able to continue these broadcasts to the present day only by paying a few men and privately employed staff to charge with the hope that KURAGE would see fit to continue this going and collect the KURAGE effort. AMARISM I made a request to AMARISM I for this offer to have in the next six or \$1,000 per year in order to pay the salaries of the AMARISM I employees and to cover their full time on these broadcasts and to cover all other costs of broadcasting. It should be noted that there are no Rylorussian nationalist broadcasts in the Rylorussian language in existence. (NOTE: The Rylorussian broadcasts over Radio Liberation are not nationalist in content and are strictly controlled to accord with a non-offensive policy toward the nationalizing issue.) These broadcasts over Radio Madrid are not currently being censured by the Spanish government. Unless the KURAGE section of the AMARISM project is renewed, AMARISM I will in the immediate future be obliged to discontinue this successful and popular KURAGE effort. It should be reiterated that our AMARISM I newspaper will in the immediate future be obliged to keep the AMARISM I newspaper alive a little longer. It should also be reiterated that our AMARISM I contacts, quite unlike most Rylorussian contacts engaged in KURAGE activities, have repeatedly offered to publish and broadcast anything and everything KURAGE wants. We have made little use of this offer.

5. The effective Russianization includes, under the KUBARK purposes consists of three twenty DEKAMETSEI 1 enigma. All of the SOBERISTE 1 numbers with whom KUBARK has been in contact have proven in many ways to be more fully cooperative than groups of kindred opposite outlook in other enigma groups. This has been the reason alone (if not only) of being FIVEHIVE leaders. They have no doubts about having been invading KUBARK or SOBERISTE leaders to get exclusive management and do not feel that their political mission precludes leaving high priority AFTRA requirements on any of these sympathizers in the USSR or Poland.

7. Because the ARMYWAYS operation did not work out well, a certain amount of blame for uncooperativeness has been levelled at ARMYWAYS. It is on the hypothesis that if we had had more contact with ARMYWAYS the operation would have been successful. Since this has really been the first and only contact operation which we have mounted using ARMYWAYS, it would perhaps be precipitous to make a final judgment on ARMYWAYS's cooperation on the basis of one complex and rather doubtful case. In retrospect, it would be easier to argue that ARMYWAYS was ill-served than the contrary.

3. Under present circumstances, contact operations, using AMBASSISTA 1, can be expected to yield only modest results because AMBASSISTA 1 does not have the means to send its people to the cities where the few Byelorussians who do travel abroad are most likely to appear. The fact that the head of AMBASSISTA 1 lives in Paris does not negate this statement since he is too occupied with other activities and is too well known to be useful in making clandestine cold approaches. There are, in addition, relatively few individuals from Byelorussia who travel abroad; there are also some Byelorussians who appear in Europe from the Byelorussian colonies in Poland. The brother of AMBASSISTA 1, a resident of BUDAPEST, anticipates traveling to Berlin in the fall of 1950; it is believed that he can be expected to undertake a full-scale or the initial AMBASSISTA operation, if this should be found desirable. The lack of funds available to AMBASSISTA 1 has been the main obstacle in undertaking any concerted program of contact operations. AMBASSISTA 1 does have young men who are qualified to carry out cold approaches, but they are going to pay him to do their main work and hotel bill. It has been also recommended in the BUREAU dispatches, AMBASSISTA 1 appears to have once declined money in the Byelorussian colony in Poland, but to date KUBARK has undertaken no attempt or suggestion to try to exploit them for operations into the fall.

[illegible]

to the real crux of the issue rather than an implied KUCAGE ineffectiveness of AR/3, USSR 1, which has managed to do a lot with a very small subsidy. It is also added here that the CHANCE program of supporting the KUCAGE efforts of the Latvian and Estonian emigre groups undoubtedly costs many times more than the AR/3, USSR 1 subsidy of \$18,000--only because there are more EXPERIMENTAL (and KUCAGE) subjects who are familiar with the issue of nationalism in these Baltic areas. Although the population represented by these Baltic emigre groups (4,500,000) is less than half the size of the USSR's population, the problem of nationalist implications is substantially as different in Byelorussia than it is in the Baltic lands. Similarly, the potential usefulness of the Byelorussians in past and future is no less important than that of the Baltic nationalities.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS: If it is in the interest of KUCAGE to run KUCAGE on a small scale into the third largest republic of the USSR, the BSR, there is only one organization which shows any capability in this direction, i.e., AR/3, USSR 1. It is submitted that the proofs of AR/3, USSR 1 effectiveness are much greater now than those of the other three emigre groups (which together get about a million dollars of KUCAGE money). Furthermore, since the other KUCAGE projects have not owed or fallen by their KUCAGE production or their KUCAGE operational results, it would now seem advisable to use a different set of funds to subsidize the AR/3, USSR 1 KUCAGE case. In view of the above, the recommended recommendations:

1. That the AR/3, USSR 1 KUCAGE subsidy be continued and that it be increased to the sum of not more than [] and not less than [] in order to permit the continuation of operation of the KUCAGE activities which are currently proving effective and in order to permit mounting some contact operations directed at Byelorussians traveling in Europe.

2. That favorable consideration be given to subsidizing the Byelorussian language broadcasts over Radio Liberty to the sum of \$4,000.

3. That the lack of success in one contact operation (the failure of which may or may not be fully attributable to AR/3, USSR 1 himself) should not be considered an adequate reason to cancel the entire AR/3, USSR 1 KUCAGE project or be considered an adequate gauge for predicting the results of future contact operations.

4. That, since the nature of the past AR/3, USSR 1 activities and the future outlook for this project are similar to those being handled by AR/3, future handling of Project AR/3, USSR 1 be transferred from DUB to AR/3. (It has never been clear to the undersigned why Project AR/3, USSR 1 was not transferred into a KUCAGE project under AR/3 at the same time and for the same reasons that AR/3, USSR 1 was.)

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